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2Abstract
This paper explores ways in which new ventures not only adapt to but can
transform their own business environment. It proposes a new way to combine
evolutionary and Penrosian resource-based theories. A parallel is drawn
between the proactive response to resource shortfalls and under-use in the
Penrosian firm and the way entrepreneurial participants in innovative
networks can build complementary capability. Two case studies of biopharm
ventures show how participants cumulatively altered prevailing business
conditions and selection processes. The approach shows how evolutionary
theory can be used to identify overlooked connections and clarify overlooked
causal processes that have collective effects. How entrepreneurial activity
lays the basis for further innovation is revealed by an analysis with the wider
potential to bridge evolutionary and resource based approaches.
Keywords: Biopharmaceutical networks; the entrepreneurial firm; resource-
based theory; evolutionary theory.
3Introduction
This paper explores ways in which new firms can alter their environment in
the course of their early development. It is well attested that established
companies alter their conditions of business by exerting market power (Porter
1985) or by forms of lobbying (Garud et al. 2002).  Whether new firms can
alter their developmental conditions is seldom addressed in the economics of
the firm, including work taking an innovation perspective (Morroni 2006;
Simonetti et al. 1998). Resource-constrained new ventures are prima facie the
least likely of firms to command influence over their environment. Even
among authors who otherwise depart from neoclassical assumptions, it is
assumed that new entrants have to adapt to external conditions.  While this is
true of macro-conditions, such as rates of exchange and entrenched
institutions, there are indications from network and institutional
entrepreneurship studies bearing indirectly on this issue that significant
features of firms’ environment are amenable to change (Powell 1996; Garud
et al. 2002). To make this the main object of inquiry requires an analysis of
new firm development together with analysis of the shifting conditions in
which new firms operate. For this purpose we apply resource-based theory of
the firm and economic evolutionary theory. This choice of conceptualization
embodies our parallel aim, to contribute to current efforts to unite these
theoretical approaches.
There is increasing recognition of the complementarities between economic
evolutionary theory and resource-based theorizing about the firm
(Montgomery 1995, p. 251; Ulrich 2000).  Theories of dynamic capabilities,
4in particular, make use of ideas from both perspectives (Teece et al. 1997;
Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Zolla and Winter 2002; Helfat and Peteraf
2003). Our development of “resource-based evolutionary theory” differs from
such earlier work in respects that include the following. We bring the
combined theories to bear on the same body of case evidence. This
confrontation of theory with evidence is used to cut the Gordian knot that
entangles abstract versions of Darwinian theory (Buensdorf 2006). It
provides a version of evolutionary theory that addresses current business
issues in a pragmatic manner, as recommended by Nelson (Nelson 2006). We
examine capability building in new ventures rather than by incumbent firms
to see how capability-building within a network of firms enables
entrepreneurial managers to alter their business environment. We identify
resource mismatches that provide an impetus to entrepreneurial capability
building. We show that open systems ideas provide a meta-theoretical
perspective that can encompass both evolutionary and resource based theory.
The paper starts with an overview of evolutionary theorizing in economics
and of resource-based theories of the firm, identifying complementarities
between the two, and goes on to apply concepts from systems thinking to
bridge these approaches. This review of prior work and our own position is
summarized in the form of propositions that challenge previously held
assumptions on the inability of new entrants to change their environment.
The propositions specify how new firms can build resource
complementarities in ways that impact on business conditions. A more
detailed and empirically grounded exposition of the propositions is provided
5in case studies of two biopharm start-ups that built network-based capabilities
to implement innovations. We conclude with an overview of the wider
applications of our conceptualization and findings for theory and practice.
Biopharmaceutical innovation provides the setting for the inquiry, this being
a particularly demanding environment for a new firm.  Innovation in
biopharm relies on inter-firm partnerships of various kinds; the high
incidence of such alliances among major pharmaceutical companies is shown
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Biotechnology Alliances of Top 20 Pharmas 1998-2003
(Recombinant Capital 2003)
There are many competing and complementary accounts of the functions,
roles and dynamics of biotech networks in the literature on networks that use
diverse definitions of networks. Relevant theories include those located in the
6overview in Figure 2.  Our approach populates the lower right quadrant in the
literature on business networks, being concerned with the creation of
networks for the development of new drugs, drug delivery innovation and
new supply chains.
Research Area References
Agency Theory Eisenhardt (1989)
Cluster / industrial district theory Piore and Sabel (1984), Porter (1998) Perry (1999)
Competitive strategy Miles and Snow (1986)
Ethnic business networks Light (1972), Phizacklea (1990), Perry (1999)
Learning networks Powell and Brantley (1992), Powell et al. (1996),
Powell (1996)
Process approach to inter-firm
collaboration
Larson (1992), Ring and Van de Ven (1994), Doz
(1996)
Social embeddedness theory Granovetter (1973; 1985), Rond (2003)
Structural hole theory Burt (1992)
Supply chain management Fisher (1997), Lamming (2000), Lee (2002), Liker
and Choi (2004)
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7Rationale for the study and alternative perspectives on issues raised
The wider rationale for the inquiry concerns the way in which entrepreneurial
activity lays the basis for further innovation. The ability of a new firm to
secure and sustain competitive advantage is a central concern in the study of
strategy, innovation and entrepreneurship. How entrepreneurial innovation
creates positive externalities that open up further possibilities for innovation
can be informed by literature on strategic positioning (Porter 1991), on
industry evolution (Klepper 1996), on institutional entrepreneurship (Garud
et al. 2002) and social networks (Powell et al. 1996). Other relevant
perspectives include population ecology (Hannan and Carroll 1992) and
resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Leong 1977). While these authors
include material very pertinent to the relationship between firm and
environment, to address our research questions and evidence we need a less
eclectic conceptual framework than these diverse contributions provide. Our
argument is that pragmatic evolutionary theory combined with Penrosian
resource-based theory offer a conceptually coherent and comprehensive basis
for explaining the relationship between the new firm, its networks and its
business environment.
Complementarities between evolutionary theory and resource-based
theories of the firm
Both Penrosian resource-based theory and evolutionary theories adopt a
dynamic approach to reveal mechanisms and processes of change that are
obscured by equilibrium frameworks (Penrose 1995; Winter 1964; Nelson
81982). Both constitute what Nelson calls ‘appreciative theory’ providing a
basis for asking questions that cannot be addressed by less dynamic theories
(Nelson 1998, p.319). Both aim to explain the heterogeneity of firms. Many
complementarities have been identified between these approaches
(Montgomery 1995, p. 251; Foss 1997, Witt 2000). Studies of dynamic
capability, in particular, are increasingly drawing on both resource-based and
evolutionary ideas (Helfat and Peteraf 2003).
Nevertheless there are apparent disparities between the Penrosian resource-
based theory used here and evolutionary economics.  In common usage,
evolutionary means gradual, unfolding or developmental. This is the sense in
which Penrose’s thought on the firm was evolutionary. ‘Evolutionary’ also
has a more precise reference to a type of change often associated with natural
selection in biology (Van de Ven and Poole 1995; Nelson 2006). Penrose
rejected biological analogies because she saw them as depicting “action
taking place in human affairs without the intervention of human decisions
based on deliberation and choice” (Penrose 1952, p. 816). She was opposed
to the deterministic assumptions she believed to be embedded in biological
analogies.
But understanding of evolutionary theory has moved on considerably since
the early attempts at applying biological models criticised by Penrose.
Indeed evolutionary reasoning could be described in the terms Penrose
applied to homeostasis: “Strictly speaking, the basic principle is not a
9biological one .. [but] a general principle…(Penrose 1952 p. 816).”
Evolutionary theory is increasingly recognised to be a general theory of
change wherever variety, systematically generated, is culled by selection
processes (Nelson 2006). Processes of variety creation, selection and
propagation occur not only in biology but also in the evolution of language,
science and technology, among other spheres (Metcalfe 1998; Van de Ven
and Poole 1995). Experimental new ventures generate economic variety.
Selection in economic life is a process of elimination that culls variety among
populations of units such as firms, technologies and firm routines.1
Propagation of selected units operates not only through biological inheritance
but through diffusion processes that differ according to the specifics of
different contexts: language for example is replicated and diffused by
mechanisms of intergenerational learning and migration. Change of this kind
in the socio-economic world involves learning on the part of agents and
changes in the opportunity space in which they operate.2  If we can show that
a new venture can deliberately alter its environment and the very selection
forces that operate upon it, this demonstrates the importance of the
entrepreneurial decision making and motivation which Penrose justifiably
viewed as a central object of inquiry.
                                                 
1 The units of selection and propagation on which inquiry is focused depends on the level and scope of
the analysis (McKelvey 1996). We show that economic networks may be a selected unit; favourable
forces of selection are found in conditions where resources are made available to that network.
2 ICC reviewer’s observation.
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Dynamic processes set off by uneven resource availability
It is still unusual to draw on the work of Penrose in exploring entrepreneurial
networks since she wrote about growth in the mature and integrated industrial
firm (Lockett 2005). However her ideas on knowledge building as a
cumulative process driving the growth of a firm can usefully be applied to
new firms (Garnsey 1998). We show here that a Penrosian approach need not
be confined to the firm  (nor to firms that build a production base in-house).
We show that her approach to the dynamics of growth is relevant to networks
of firms that engage in co-production with partners rather than developing
internal production facilities. Here too, the experience and outlook of
entrepreneurs shape the way opportunities are detected and activated
(Penrose 1995, p. 3).
We found striking parallels in our case evidence between the proactive
response to resource shortfalls and under-use in the Penrosian firm and the
activities of entrepreneurial participants in innovative networks. Penrose saw
that even the well-resourced mature firm is continually faced with both
resource deficits and resources that cannot be put to full use. Resources are
available not in convenient increments but in ‘uneven multiples’. Since
equipment and personnel, for instance, are never available in precisely the
combination required at a given time, some overloading or under-use of
resources is inevitable: “… in putting together the jig-saw puzzle of resources
required in an expansion programme, the firm may find that a number of
11
awkward corners persist in sticking out” (Penrose 1995, p. 69). While
resource constraints are obvious, the under-use of certain resources may not
be recognised until managers discover new uses for unexploited resources.
Penrose saw that under-used resources could actually stimulate growth if they
are dealt with by obtaining or creating complementary resources, so
enlarging the company’s knowledge base - from which new opportunities can
be pursued (Penrose 1995, p. 54).3
Teamwork and shared experience “not only causes the productive
opportunity of a firm to change … but also contributes to the ‘uniqueness’ of
the opportunity of each individual firm” (Penrose 1995, pp. 52-3). A
generation before the pursuit of opportunity was identified as the defining
feature of enterprise (Shane 2000), Penrose described the environment as “an
image in the eye of the entrepreneur.” That is, she held that perceptions shape
the way firms respond to their environment and the business conjectures they
formulate, though ultimately the success of their conjectures depend on
economic realities. Penrose wrote of established firms that they not only
influence their environment but know that they can do so (Penrose 1995, pp.
41-2). While acknowledging that established firms can alter their
environment, Penrose put the influence of the environment ‘on one side in
the first instance in order to permit concentration on the firm’s internal
resources’ in her Theory of the Growth of the Firm (preface p. xiii 1995).4
                                                 
3 “Unused productive services … facilitate the introduction of new combinations of resources … [for]
the production of new products, new processes for production of old products, new organization of
administrative functions.” (Penrose 1995, p 85).
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But as shown in the case study on which her book was based, in practice she
saw firm growth as governed by “a creative and dynamic interaction between
a firm’s productive resources and its market opportunities” (Penrose 1960).5
More recent work on dynamic capabilities has developed  this idea more
fully. In this paper we explore this interaction in early-stage companies to see
how it affects the new firms’ business environment.
Alternative versions of the resource-based view of the firm
Teece and others have shown how firms can adapt, reconfigure and integrate
resources and skills to exploit new market opportunities (Teece et al. 1997).
They built on work investigating how competitive advantage is generated by
the firm’s unique bundle of resources (Lockett 2005; Barney 1991; Conner
and Prahalad 1996). 6 Barney had focused on the attributes (valuable, rare,
inimitable, organisational support) of discrete resources that generate rents.
These resources are said to be what give rise to firm attributes that are
difficult to imitate and thereby enhance the firm’s potential for sustained
competitive advantage (Barney 1991).
In contrast, Penrose had viewed resources not as a given set of attributes but
as combined and used in ways that change over time, leading to changes in
“the productive possibilities that the firms’ ‘entrepreneurs’ see and can take
                                                 
4 ICC reviewer’s contribution
5 Studies of technology speciation have come to focus on the way in which innovations from
established firms arise from technologies that prove unexpectedly to have applications in new market
domains (Levinthal 1998). The extent to which Penrose anticipated this theme in her 1960 Hercules
Powder case study is not recognized in the technology speciation literature.
6 For an overview of the controversy between Penrosian and competitive attribute resource-based
approaches, see Lockett (2005) and Thompson and Wright (2005).
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advantage of” (Penrose 1995, p. 31). Penrose pointed out that a firm’s unique
‘productive services’ and ‘basic strengths’ (her term for capabilities) may
outlive specific products (Penrose 1995, p.150). The life cycle model of
capability building develops these ideas further (Helfat and Peteraf 2003).
Helfat and Peteraf view the development of dynamic capability (defined as a
firm’s ability to use resources to perform a coordinated set of tasks to achieve
its ends) as the outcome of learning-by-doing in a team context, of deliberate
process improvement, problem solving and investment (Helfat and Peteraf
2003). They see dynamic capability development as a less linear, more fitful
process than do Zolla and Winter, who defined dynamic capabilities in terms
of systematic patterns of organizational activity aimed at the generation and
adaptation of operating routines (Zolla and Winter 2002). This literature
indicates that if entrepreneurial firms in biopharm networks seek to develop
dynamic capabilities to coordinate the operational capabilities of their
members, repeated efforts will be required before these attempts succeed in
achieving their objectives reliably; capabilities are not built in a day.
Penrose emphasised that history matters in the firm; in this respect, modern
theorists are justified in seeing the building of new resources as restrained by
the firm’s inability to move in directions incompatible with its prior
experience. Just how firm specific are the capabilities that confer competitive
advantage is a question on which our case evidence has bearing. 
7
                                                 
7 Recent resource-based theory has emphasised that when strategies stem from firm-specific resources,
they are not easily replicated by competing firms. Dierickx and Cool (1989), for example, emphasised
that competitive advantage is most likely to result from the development of unique asset stocks built up
through resource accumulation.
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Economic evolutionary theories have contributed relatively little to the field
of entrepreneurship studies; their perspectives are absent for example in
Shane 2003. 8 It has been recognised that variety generation (by new entrants)
has received little attention in evolutionary economics, the focus having been
on selection processes (Metcalfe 1998).9 But resource-based concepts are
also largely absent in entrepreneurship studies, with a few exceptions (Brush
et al. 2001). Conceding that the modern strand of resource-based theory
could be combined with other approaches, Alvarez and Barney have written
that  “… resource-based models of strategic advantage may need to be
augmented by theories of creative and entrepreneurial process…these
observations suggest a very close relationship between theories of strategic
advantage and theories of creativity and entrepreneurship” (Alvarez and
Barney 2001, p. 53).  Penrose’s original conception has much to offer here.
Evolutionary Approaches and the Firm’s Industrial Environment
Evolutionary theory has rich and varied traditions outside biology (Durand
2006). Here we focus on one strand of this approach, the economic theory of
variety generation and selection processes (McKelvey 1996). While Penrose
was interested in how entrepreneurial firms develop their resource base and
identify new market opportunities, evolutionary economists have highlighted
selection mechanisms that influence the evolution of technologies and
industries (Nelson 1982; Nelson 2006; McKelvey 1996). They view this as
                                                 
8 Two consecutive volumes of Research Policy,  one on evolutionary theory (Vol. 31 nos. 8-9 Dec
2002), one on technology entrepreneurship (Vol. 32 no. 2 Feb 2003), illustrate the divide between
evolutionary theory in economics and entrepreneurship studies.  There is no cross-referencing of
themes and authors between the two issues of the same journal, symptomatic of the wider literature.
9 Aldrich (1999) has given useful attention to variety generation by new ventures in an evolutionary
sociology approach.  However Schumpeter does not appear in the index to his book; linkages between
entrepreneurial innovation and the economy are not on his agenda.
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the outcome of the operation of selection forces on the destinies of specific
innovating firms, the incubators and carriers of innovations.  In evolutionary
theory, multi-level analysis can occur as the unit of selection examined shifts,
e.g. from routines selected by the firm to the selection of firms by market
forces and institutional arrangements. Early attempts to apply evolutionary
theory to firms in the economy focused at the industry level and on the
internal selection processes through which firms adopt unique routines,
informed by the theory of natural selection (Nelson and Winter 1982). Nelson
and Winter departed from the tradition of the representative firm of orthodox
economics, proposing a focus on the way an internal selection environment
within the firm can select for skills, organisational capabilities and behaviour
which shape unique routines for conducting businesses and create differences
between firms.
Selection forces do not function on blind basis in economic life but instead
evoke learning, anticipation and deliberate responses.  The transmission of
learned responses is Lamarkian rather than Darwinian, but it was Darwin
who provided insight into the feedback processes through which selection
forces operate. Market forces that affect firm viability can be seen as a form
of selection. Their operation is analysed in the industrial structure approach
to strategy (Porter 1991).10 But many sectors are too immature or volatile to
                                                 
10 Porter has criticised the resource-based theory as based on circular reasoning:  “Successful firms are
successful because they have unique resources. They should nurture these resources to be successful
…” He maintained that the resource-based theory does not recognise that “resources are not valuable
in and of themselves, but because they … create advantages in particular markets” (Porter 1991 pp.
108-109). This criticism does not apply to the original work of Penrose; the latter part of her Theory of
the Growth of the Firm has much insight into the relationship between resources and market conditions,
explored in detail in her 1960 case study.
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have a stable industrial structure. In biopharmaceuticals for example,
conditions have altered rapidly as new technologies have emerged and ‘low
hanging fruit’11 have been harvested. New entrants, mergers and unstable
capital markets have brought about rapid industry restructuring (Garnsey
2004).   Biopharmaceutical ventures operate in an environment characterised
by high drug development costs, long development periods, entrenched
institutional arrangements, stringent regulations and alliance competition.
Conventional industrial structure frameworks with their methodology of
comparative statics (Porter 1991) are not suited to depicting evolving
business environments characterized by alliance-based supply and regulation-
mediated demand, the features of which are captured by the concept of a
dynamic selection environment.
Bridging Conceptual Gaps
While the intellectual background to ideas from evolutionary and resource-
based theory is complex, the key ideas are relatively simple. Shorn of
elaborate biological correspondences and analogies, these concepts can be
combined to achieve the aim of evolutionary theory: to uncover how detailed
processes give rise to collective effects. Here we aim to show how resource
building by and between young firms is affected by selection forces that
make available or deny them the resources they need to emerge and operate.
                                                 
11 Examples include Interferon-  which was for many years the therapy of choice for use with
traditional chemotherapy in certain leukemias and multiple myeloma and monoclonal antibodies such
as Herceptin (trastuzumab) and Erbitux (cetuximab) (Editorial, Nature Biotechnology 23(267).
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Resources needed are inputs of funds, knowledgeable people and equipment -
sustained by the revenues obtained from outputs.
Selection processes respond to such quantitative signals and indicators as
costs and prices. Salaries and share price value are among the signals of
relative reward that shape perceptions and motivations and thus drive further
action and response. But in the networks of the modern economy, selection
forces do not depend only on market signals. They include relationship-
mediated interactions with other businesses and with regulators that differ
from the impersonal forces, costs and prices of market theory. The symbolic
interaction that informs and motivates material exchange is cultural as well as
economic.
Systems ideas provide a meta-perspective that brings into mutual focus
resource-based and evolutionary theory. Evolutionary and resource-based
approaches implicitly share the idea that a firm is an open system exchanging
resources with its environment (Scott 1987).12 The firm receives inputs from
resource providers, develops productive resources which it uses to transform
inputs into resource outputs and obtains returns from the distributors and
customers who buy its output. Firms secure investment resources by giving
investors a stake in subsequent returns. We can depict the agents with whom
the firm interacts as constituting its transaction environment. In Figure 3 the
                                                 
12 Systems thinking is implicit in both approaches because modern social science is infused with
systems-based concepts such as resources and environment, which go back to its earliest thinkers
(Mayr 1971; Scott 1987)
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transaction environment graphic depicts interactions between a firm and other
organisations beyond its administrative boundary.
Figure 3: The Firm Experiences Selection through Interactions with Others in
its Transaction Environment
This graphic provides a device for comparing otherwise dissimilar case
evidence (Figures 5 and 7). Rather than viewing the firm’s value chain as
linear, the transaction environment represents the firm as linked into a web of
related activities. Each organisation has its own transaction environment for
its various activities. Whether this develops into a lasting business network
that outlives specific product development needs depends on whether
transactions are recurrent and continuous. If a business network is to be
sustained, interactions must be sufficiently recurrent and intensive to create
shared understanding, legitimisation and relations of interdependence. Social
structure is constituted by such recurrent patterns of interaction (Giddens
1984).13  Looking at this process from the perspective of evolutionary theory,
                                                 
13 In structuration terms, a social structure such as a network is both the medium and the outcome of
action (Giddens 1984).
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the network constituted by recurrent transactions between associated firms
may be viewed as a unit of selection, provided with or denied resources by
selection processes.
Unless the new firm has inherited resources, it must create a new resource
base to generate market returns acceptable to resource providers.14 As the
firm grows, its resources may come to support a variety of productive
bases.15 Penrose pointed out that: “… movement into a new base requires a
firm to achieve competence in some significantly different area of
technology” (Penrose 1995, p. 110).  Just as the productive base is not static,
so the firm’s transaction environment differs for different products and is
more extensive for multiple products and multiple stages of production. As it
enters different sectors, it will experience the operation of sector-specific
selection forces.
Whether the new firm will be allocated or denied the resources it requires
depends on how selection forces impact on it. There is deliberation in the
way in which many features of economic selection operate. A firm is selected
by others when they decide to do business with it, to engage with it in
economic transactions. Resource providers choose to make available inputs
such as investment and component supplies and customers provide revenue
                                                 
14 Companies that address similar developmental problems in a common sequence tend to experience
similar phases of activity (Garnsey 1998). But there are no invariant phases of activity in new firm
development because different problems arise and re-arise in ventures undertaking diverse activities.
The building of different kinds of resource base involves different sequences of activity, and even in
specific sectors, problems are addressed indifferently through diverse business models.
15 The term ‘productive base’ is used here because Penrose’s concept of production base can also be
applied to service activities. For example research services require the productive capacity to generate,
process, store and retrieve information and convert it into meaningful knowledge communicated to
clients.
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resources when they select its products. In biopharmaceutical markets,
regulatory institutions play a key part in selection processes by endorsing or
approving the firm and its products. Consumer preference is mediated by the
product choices of physicians, hospitals and health system officials. Public
opinion influences whether the activity has legitimacy. Industry regulators
influence criteria defining ‘fitness’ for a given environment. For
biopharmaceutical firms, regulators play a critical role because an
unendorsed product is prohibited from market entry, whereas an innovative
drug approved for the treatment of a serious disease or disorder stands a good
chance of acceptance by the market.
Another approach using implicit systems thinking is
resource dependency theory, which examines relations of
power that stem from control by one organization over
resources needed by another organization (Pfeffer 1982;
Boyd 1990). This theory has much in common with the
approach we propose. Resource dependency theory has
been mainly used to investigate issues of organizational
legitimacy and organizational structure. But a version of
bridging strategies to overcome resource dependency is
seen in our case evidence. Bridging strategies reduce the chances of a
resource shortage, by strengthening the links between the organization and its
suppliers (Scott 1987).
Our argument is summarised in a set of propositions, an early stage in theory
building.  These challenge previous assumptions about the need for a new
21
firm simply to adapt to its environment and specify means by which new
ventures can influence their environment.  While other interpretations of our
evidence would be possible, our argument is that evolutionary and resource-
based theory, integrated by systems concepts, provide a coherent and
economical account of how it is that new firms can alter their environment.16
We are not presenting falsifiable hypotheses but the elements or constructs of
a theoretical perspective, connected axiomatically. This can be used to
explain developments at one level of analysis (advances in
biopharmaceuticals) in terms of evidence of more detailed processes
(innovative networks). It would be possible to disconfirm our argument by
presenting an explanation both more economical and more comprehensive of
our evidence. Any such advance would be enlightening.
Proposition 1:  Selection forces that impact on the processes of development
of new firms are amenable to influence by these very firms.
P1 challenges previous assumptions in the literature that the new firm is
faced with an environment to which it must adapt without prospect of
changing it.
Proposition 2: A new firm experiences via its transaction environment the
forces of selection which allocate or withhold the resources it needs to
survive and grow.
P2 specifies that parties doing business with the new firm are the agents who
provide or withhold the resources the firm requires.
                                                 
16 Any such account is provisional, following Popper on the provisional status of knowledge subject to
a systematic intellectual selection process, and thus open to refutation by a better explanatory schema
(Popper 2002).
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The three propositions that follow state how relationships with such agents
can be used to access and build needed resources:
Proposition 3: An entrepreneurial firm can be proactive in shaping its own
transaction environment.
Proposition 4: A new firm can use its transaction environment to access, via
those with which it interacts, the complementary resources needed to achieve
its aims.
Proposition 5: A network of partners can together build complementary
resources.
P5 moves the focus of analysis to the level of the network to claim that there
is complementary resource building at this level, not just at the level of the
firm.
Proposition 6: Resource shortages and under-used resources encourage the
entrepreneurial firm to develop complementary resources and find new
domains of application. This can be termed a ‘resource-opportunity
dynamic.’
P6 summarises Penrose’s argument detailed above.
Proposition 7: A resource-opportunity dynamic takes place not only within
entrepreneurial firms but also between innovative firms who contribute
collectively to the growth of an innovative network.
P7 applies P6 to the network level.
Proposition 8: Enrepreneurial learning in networks is a path dependent
process influenced by the resource-opportunity dynamic.
P8 is an inference from the previous propositions.
23
Methods based on correlating statistical associations depend on comparative
statics that are not suited to uncovering unfolding processes. This is what
Schumpeter meant when he criticised the type of statistical approach that:
“keeps analysis on the surface of things and prevents it from penetrating into
the industrial processes below, which are what really matters.” (Schumpeter,
1939, p. 44).  Case histories are here used to provide a detailed exposition of
such processes. The analysis of the case histories enables us to articulate
propositions P1 to P8 more fully. These sum up some overlooked firm level
processes that underlie cumulative and collective outcomes at the level of
industry and economy.
An empirical context for the application of resource-based evolutionary
theory
Biopharm ventures face a difficult environment dominated by large
corporations, regulators and impatient investors. They operate as agents of
innovation because competition between the large pharmaceutical companies
for new compounds provides incentives for them to turn to innovative
biopharmaceutical ventures to renew their product portfolios (Simon and
Kotler 2003 pp. 55 - 57; Tyebjee and Hardin 2004).  The giant
pharmaceuticals are concerned to set up R &D alliances with new ventures
that have specialist expertise (Figure 1).17 Pharmaceutical managers
explained to us how even well resourced pharmaceutical companies cannot
                                                 
17In-licensing from biopharm ventures has been the most prominent strategy adopted by the large
pharmaceutical companies. Acquisition has become less prevalent and external sourcing has been
shifting towards earlier stage compounds from the 1990s (Lane and Probert 2005).  There is increasing
understanding of the inter-dependence nature of biotech-pharma relationships (Lane and Probert 2005)
and ways of enhancing their productivity (Leong 2005). To move beyond aggregate evidence on the
incidence of partnerships (Figure 1), we need to understand patterns of interaction at the firm and
network level (Larson 1992; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Doz 1996; Lane and Probert 2005).
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afford to develop expertise in the full range of emerging scientific
specialisms required for drug discovery, particularly when research outcomes
are uncertain and investor pressures are short term. The time taken to develop
a new drug and its development costs have been escalating; one estimate is
ten to fifteen years and $802 million (Tufts University, 2001). R&D alliances
aim to reduce the very high upfront cost of research preceding the lengthy
and costly regulatory approval process.
The two case studies were selected from a range of cases on biotech ventures
prepared by the authors (Garnsey 2003; Leong 2005). The rationale for the
case selection was that these ventures set out deliberately to transform their
own business environment, were ambitious in aiming at integrated drug
discovery and production, yet differed in terms of the type of innovation
undertaken. Biopharmacetical ventures require heavy funding  if they aim to
add value to their intellectual property through drug development, rather than
obtaining revenues from feeding drug discoveries into the pipeline of an
established pharmaceutical company. They use the prospect of shared future
returns to persuade investors to support their activities. Figure 1 showed that
this type of alliance is relatively rare, since pharmaceutical companies
concentrate on drug discovery alliances. The case study companies were
unusual in aiming to co-produce their products, though without the high costs
of in-house production.
The cases draw on documentary evidence and interviews with entrepreneurs,
CEOs, process development, production, regulatory and commercialisation
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managers at the biopharmaceutical ventures, together with interviews with
their contract manufacturers and clinical research organisations on their
biopharmaceutical development networks (Leong 2005; Garnsey 2004). The
various accounts provided by interviewees were compared for consistency.
Although some conflicting viewpoints were in evidence, a sequence of events
could be constructed by comparing interviews and from documentary
evidence. The cases were further checked by interviewees who corrected
errors and misunderstandings.
Company A
Company A is a biopharmaceutical enterprise founded in the 1980s to
develop a radio-labelled monoclonal antibody for treating cancer Y, annually
diagnosed in approximately 190,000 people worldwide.18 This new drug
(Medicine A) had an annual market potential of around $850 million. It was
developed from research through to phase II clinical trials at the Cherry
Research Institute in the 1980s, where the positive results of the phase II
trials inspired the founding of Company A. The development of Medicine A
was taken through to the phase III clinical trials initiated in 1998.19 Orphan
Drug status sought in the US and the EU would have guaranteed respectively
seven and ten years of market exclusivity had phase III trials gained approval.
But development efforts were discontinued when phase III trials for advanced
                                                 
18 For more than 70% of target patients having advanced disease at the time of diagnosis, survival rates
were poor. Medicine A was targeted at patients who have entered remission following surgery and
chemotherapy, with the aim of destroying any remaining cancer cells and so preventing or delaying
relapse.
19 Phase III trials are therapeutic large-scale trials at several trial centres and on different patient
populations for final establishment of the therapeutic profile, which includes indication, dosage and
types of administration, contra-indication, side effects and precautionary measures. Phase III trials also
need to establish proof of efficacy and safety in long-term administration. In addition, therapeutic
advantage over existing drugs must also be demonstrated and any interactions with concomitant
medication also need to be clarified.
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disease patients treated with Medicine A showed no better results than those
of patients in the comparative arm of the trials.
The case studies focus on early attempts by these bio-ventures to create a
network of organizations that could provide them with the resources they
needed to create and capture value. In company A, the project manager was
the founder who built the necessary infrastructure for developing Medicine A
from the laboratory base. A small team of specialist staff was brought
together to manage the emerging development network. The skills of this
team grew with experience of working together, but was greatly extended by
the work they carried out with the partners whom they introduced to each
other, creating a developmental network. The key development tasks
involved in Medicine A defined partnership requirements and are
summarised in Table 1.
Drug Development Stages Tasks involving innovative partnerships
Process improvement for antibody
ß Change of cell culture method to meet potential market demand
ß Purification
ß Analytical
ß Formulation
Linker manufacturing
Primary Manufacturing
Radioisotope manufacturing
Secondary Manufacturing Vialling
Phase III Clinical Trials
ß Design clinical development plan
ß Design individual clinical studies
ß Design and write individual study protocol
ß Identification and setup of clinical sites to take part in the
studies – including interaction with regulatory authorities
ß Selection of CROs to provide the necessary support and
infrastructure for each of the clinical studies
ß Running and monitoring the clinical studies.
Table 1: Key Development Tasks for Medicine A
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Building partnerships to advance product development
The development team had difficulty finding contract manufacturers for
Medicine A because of the novelty of their requirements, their limited
financial resources and the small size of their orders. Medicine A consisted of
antibody, linker and radioisotope. Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP)
accreditation was needed for all three.
The manufacturing process developed in the hospital laboratory for
producing antibodies was inadequate for regulatory approval. A contract
manufacturer was sought to improve on the process and to make it GMP-
compliant. Company A took up a small contract manufacturer located abroad,
Mabman, which had the expertise to scale-up the laboratory process and
proved adept at introducing innovations into the laboratory process (Table 2).
Cherry Research Institute MABMAN
Upstream
Roller bottles – suitable for small scale
(could only handle tens of litres per
batch). The production standards were
also inappropriate for a marketed product.
MABMAN provided a hollow fibre based
perfusion cell culture systems, which could
handle 3000l per batch.
Downstream
Purification using protein A, which is
designed to remove DNA; sepharose – a
strong anion/cation exchange medium.
MABMAN recommended a proven method to
cut the cost of producing protein A.
No facilities to remove viruses. MABMAN used a low pH=3 hold to destroy
viruses, a development step based on the
discovery that the antibody could survive this
process.
 Table 2: Critical Expertise Provided by Contractor MABMAN
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After failing to engage a local chemical manufacturer to produce the linker,
Company A found Linkman, a US company with scientists interested in
Medicine A. While their European counterparts had dismissed the prospects
of a new venture, the US company viewed phase III development as
significant enough to justify commercial interest.  Further supplier difficulties
were experienced because of the novelty of their radioisotype requirements.
The largest radioisotope-producing company in the country withdrew after
six months of discussion. Company A’s team had difficulty finding
radioisotope contractors and meet regulatory requirements.
Very few companies provided the plastic tubing and biologics vialling
needed in A’s country. Once again, the main manufacturer in the country was
not interested in introducing a complex process for a new company. But an
entrepreneurial contract company, Vialman, realised that Company A
represented new demand which made it worth developing the expertise to
vial bio-products of this kind. The vialling system jointly developed with
Company A was to provide the basis for the future expansion of Vialman.
In preparation for phase III trials, the clinical trials manager at Company A
built a network with contract research organisations (depicted by code name
in Table 3). Criteria for choosing partners included their lead time
performance and cash position.
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Tasks
1st tier Contract Research Orgs.
(CROs) 2nd tier CROs
Central Pharmacy
(distributing drugs to study
sites)
A-C3 (Country Alpha)
A-C4 (monitored US trials)
A-C6 (monitored Australia and
New Zealand trials)
A-C8 (local)
A-C9 (Croatia and Slovenia)
Monitoring (clinical
monitoring and study site
management to ensure that
investigators follow protocols) A-C7 (monitored EU trials)
A-C10 (Israel)
Data Management (statistical
advice and database
infrastructure)
A-C5 (Country Alpha)
Central Services
(a) Laboratory
(accreditation required)
A-C11 (location unknown)
A-C12 (US)A-C2 (EU)
A-C13 (Australia and New
Zealand)
(b) Histology A-C14 (Country Alpha)
A-C15 (US)
(c) CT Scan Review
A-C16 (Netherlands)
(recommended by investigators)
A-C17 (US)
(recommended by investigators)
Dosimeter Consultant
A-C18 (US)
(recommended by FDA)
Independent Auditing A-C19
Table 3: Contract Research Organisations for Medicine A
Pharmaceutical alliance
Seeking a pharmaceutical partner for later stage development and
commercialisation was a strategy designed to secure immediate and long-
term liquidity, and to serve as a validation of Medicine A. An initial alliance
with a pharmaceutical company was terminated when this company
reassessed its product portfolio and abandoned Medicine A. Company A
approached another big company, Pharma-A1, but ‘cold’ contact with them
did not elicit any interest in the new venture. By chance, the Chairman of
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Company A sat beside a senior executive from Pharma-A1 at a dinner and
urged him to reconsider Company A’s potential. Within six weeks, a contract
was finalised, illustrating the impact of chance and the importance of well-
connected Board members for a new company. The agreement provided
Company A with the backing it required to continue its development work.20
Pharma-A1 had a record of partnering effectively with biopharm ventures;
they knew that value could be destroyed by acquisition that resulted in staff
losses. Instead of buying Company A outright, Pharma-A1 maintained
Company A’s autonomy and did not interfere with the products that
Company A in-licensed. Pharma A-1 proved effective in gaining the
confidence of A’s contract partners.
A summary of the transaction environment that Company A created in the
process of developing Medicine A is illustrated in Figure 4.
                                                 
20 A venture in need of immediate resources may have to forego its potential to add value on an
independent basis through vertical integration. In this case, the existence of Company A was threatened
and to ensure survival it was necessary to allow Pharma-A1 exclusive rights to most of Company A’s
product pipeline. Company A retained the right to co-develop and commercialise oncology products
currently under development together with any reaching human trials during the next five years.
Pharma-A1 took only a minority equity stake in Company A and agreed to payments in cash for new
products entering clinical studies, and milestone payments for phase III and launched drugs. The total
payments to Company A was set to surpass $500 million, if all products reached the market.
Additionally, Company A would receive royalties of 10-20% on product sales.
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Figure 4: Company A’s Transaction Environment for Developing Medicine A
Each of the relationships shown contributed resources to the network. (The
relationships between the CROs shown in Figure 4 are between 1st tier and
2nd tier contractors.) Figure 5 shows how the various actors entered the new
network as Medicine A was developed.
Strategic Alliance
 Partner: Pharma-A1
Clinical research
organisations:
As listed in Table 4
Contract Producers:
VIALMAN (Country Alpha),
MABMAN (Country Beta),
LINKMAN (US), AEA
(Country Alpha)
Funders:
- Cherry Research Institute
- Stock exchange
- Pharma-A1
Regulator:  FD
Distributors
Final
Customers
Company A -
Medicine A
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Process Improvement:
Cell culture
Purification
Formulation
Linker Manufacturing
Pre -clinical –
Phase II Clinical
Science Base 
Regulators
Radioisotope Manufacturing
Company A: 
Medicine A
Cherry Research 
Institute
FDA
Phase III Clinical
Phase III Clinical Trials:
Vialling
Monitoring
Data management
Central pharmacy
Central services: laboratory, 
histology, CT scan review
Dosimeter consultant
Independent auditing
MABMAN
A-C4
AEA
VIALMAN
A-C3
LINKMAN
A-C6 A-C7
A-C8 A-C9 A-C10
A-C5
A-C2 A-C14
A-C11 B-C12 A-C13
A-C15 A-C16 A-C17
A-C18
A-C19
Transition 
(Founding of Co. A)
Alliance Partner Pharma -A1Pharma -A2
Figure 5: Drug Development Process of Medicine A
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Company A’s Experience Analysed
That critical features of the business environment operate as selection forces
shaping the developmental processes of new firms (P2) is shown by the
experience of Company A.   Progress there depended on a collaboration with
a major pharmaceutical company which was both customer and funder to the
new venture. The collapse of the first attempt to collaborate in this way
illustrates a denial of the resources the venture needs to survive and grow.
But Company A’s transaction environment for developing Medicine A
provided the basis for a network that outlived a shift to another Pharma
partnership and the unsuccessful outcome of this product’s phase II clinical
trials. The company were able to go on to develop other products, drawing on
partnerships with companies that had collaborated in their pioneering
development efforts. Thus a new firm may use its transaction environment to
access complementary resources (P4).
Creating a favourable environment and formation of organisational
routines
In emerging sectors, an entrepreneurial venture can build resources that are
complementary with those of its partners (P5), to achieve its aims. In the late
1980s, the environment for small biopharmaceutical start-ups was
unfavourable, as seen from the difficulties the venture faced when seeking
contractors. Instead of going to a large clinical research organisation that
provided the entire range of services needed for clinical trials, Company A
adopted the strategy of using multiple contractors, many of them small,
finding benefits in working with organisations of comparable size. By
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choosing their partners’ geographical location, size and number, Company A
aimed to reduce exposure to risks and offset the uneven bargaining position
of relationships with giant pharmas.
The building of capability can be seen in the way Company A developed
routines for seeking contractors and managing interactions. In this venture,
operational routines were selected to meet relatively stable requirements and
prevent reinventing of the wheel when recurrent problems arose. However,
flexible procedures rather than fixed routines were adopted to organise their
search and learning processes in solving new technical problems.
Enhancing innovative capability in the network
A Penrosian process by which resource shortages were remedied was
observed, though inter-firm rather than intra-firm teamwork. Unable to find
contractors with proven technical competences willing to meet their needs,
they selected Mabman and Vialman though neither possessed the specific
capabilities that they needed. They undertook joint work so that new skills
and systems were developed by these suppliers. It is of significance at the
industry level that the services of these contractors became available to other
small biopharmaceutical ventures developing bio-based medicines.
Proposition 6 sums up the way resource shortages and under-used resources
may encourage entrepreneurial capability building. The case study shows
how a Penrosian resource-opportunity dynamic exploiting uneven resource
availability takes place not only within entrepreneurial firms but also between
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innovative firms who contribute collectively to the growth of an innovative
network (P7).
Building Partner Capability
In the early 1990s, many European contract manufacturers who had met
European (EMEA) requirements were reluctant to subject themselves to
approval by the US FDA who were reputed to demand costly changes in
facilities and procedures. But without manufacturing facilities compliant with
FDA standards, clinical trials could not be conducted in the US and the
world’s largest market was closed to a new drug. In the process of developing
Medicine A, the project manager introduced partner manufacturers to FDA
personnel to learn about GMP requirements. They were helped to overcome
their reluctance to deal with the FDA and to copy effective procedures for
meeting FDA requirements.
Selection processes as exerted by business partners
The deliberation inherent in economic ‘selection’ processes is evident when a
venture is selected or de-selected as a business partner. In a collaborative
network, external resources can become available to the firm through closely
managed outsourcing. Competence of this kind is built cumulatively within a
firm through team-based learning (Penrose 1995). After the collapse of their
first major alliance, the injection of new funds and technical expertise into
Company A by the new partner (Pharma-A1) improved the company’s
resource base and enabled it to continue to grow, though at a cost. In the
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circumstances the founders had to allow a dilution of their equity and control.
The alliance formed during the development of Medicine A was critical
because it enabled Company A to remain in a strong enough cash position to
continue developing other drugs in their pipeline after the failure of Medicine
A in the phase III trials. Through the various efforts of its managers,
scientists and members to create a drug development network and enhance its
capability, Company A was over time able to alter the conditions in which it
did business, exemplifying (P1).
Company B: introduction
Case B raises a current business issue: by what means can a new generic drug
firm replicate the drugs of established firms whose drugs reach patent expiry?
In biotechnology, intellectual property provides only temporary reprieve
from competition.   It is a common perception that the production of generic
drugs involves imitation rather than innovation. However, bio-generic drugs
are not produced by synthesising defined chemical identities. They involve
complex processes that use living organisms to produce the desired proteins.
New clinical trials on generic drugs are likely to required by the regulating
authorities for patient safety. Thus Company B took up a major innovative
challenge in accessing and integrating the specialist resources needed for re-
engineering a bio-process for a drug newly emerging from patent protection.
Penrose showed how a vertically integrated firm can grow new capabilities
by setting up new departments or subsidiaries engaged in complementary
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activities (Penrose 1960). Our second case study exemplifies the capability
process in a different way. In effect Company B put into practice
propositions set out earlier in this paper. Thus Company B recognised P2 (“A
new firm experiences via its transaction environment the forces of selection
which allocate or withhold the resources it needs to survive and grow”) and
sought to embody P3 (“An entrepreneurial firm can be proactive in shaping
its own transaction environment.”) To achieve this, B set out to use its
transaction environment to access complementary resources (P4) by building
partnerships (P5).
Thus the second case study exemplifies propositions 1 to 5. To move the
analysis further, we focus in this case on the opportunity-resource dynamic
(propositions 6 and 7). We examine the ways in which entrepreneurial firms
were mobilised to build capabilities initially missing among the suppliers
Company B chose to work with.
Company B’s experience
Two entrepreneurs founded Company B in 1997 through a collaboration and
joint venture with a Chinese Research Institute. One of the founders, Dr. C,
began funding research work at this Institute in 1995. He aspired to make
life-saving drugs available at affordable prices in developing countries.21 He
                                                 
21 Dr. C used mortgages to provide seed funding for Company B because he did not wish to resort to
venture capitalist funds and risk losing control of his venture. The first round of external funding was
sought two years after founding. Dr. C’s track record in another biopharmaceutical company helped
raise several million pounds through the company’s listing on a national share platform for unlisted and
unquoted securities. Dr. C appointed a CEO who had previously served as vice-president of another
biopharmaceutical company. Together they set in motion a second round of fund-raising by listing the
company on two stock exchanges in Europe and Asia on the same day. They raised £20 million and by
mid-2000, a core management team was in place.
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set out to acquire promising cell lines and gained the rights to the
manufacture and sale of six biopharmaceutical proteins derived from the cell
lines using recombinant DNA technology. The early development of these
drugs had already taken place in the Chinese Institute, but its scientists lacked
the know-how and funding to scale-up the manufacturing process and
improve product quality, as required to launch these drugs in European and
other Western countries on patent expiry. The purchase of these cell lines
represents both the detection of an opportunity to develop high value
medicines and the securing of critical resources, protected by intellectual
property. The cell lines were used for leverage in building up the other
resources needed by the company. To achieve his mission, Dr. C had to find
a cost effective way of manufacturing and marketing the drugs without
compromising quality. This case study tracks the efforts required to create
and combine through collaboration all the resources needed to take a cell line
through to market as a life saving drug.
Bio-generic Business Model
The bio-generic product Company B set out to replicate was a natural human
protein produced in the body in response to viral infection and cancer. The
worldwide market size for the drug was estimated to be $1.7bn, with the
largest share in the US. The decision to develop Medicine B was based on its
high value and the imminent expiry of patent. Company B did not set out to
create or buy laboratories, nor to employ in-house scientists or a clinical
development team.   Their business model was one of system integration,
requiring the orchestration of a complex network. All the process
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development work, pre-clinical trials and future clinical trials would be
carried out through partnerships with contractors or strategic partners. In
making decisions about partnerships, key considerations were the detailed
process of drug development and the management of an extended
development network. Table 4 shows the key development tasks of Medicine
B and the contractor/partner selection criteria.
The pioneering attempts to synthesise Medicine B elsewhere had incurred
very high costs; attempts by the originators to recoup these had led to pricing
of treatment at several thousand dollars. A second generation drug which was
simpler to administer than the first product soon captured 60% of the market.
Company B needed to create relative value greater than the existing second
generation drug. To do this, Company B entered into collaboration with
Partner-1 which owned a proven new drug delivery system.22
Drug
Development
Stages
Tasks Contractor/
Partner
Needed?
Contractor/Partner Selection
Criteria
Process
Development
• Technology transfer from the
Chinese Research Institute
• Re-cloning and cell bank
characterisation
• Fermentation
• Cell breakage
• Refolding of inclusion bodies
• Purification
• Analysis
• Formulation
Yes • Expertise in fermenting
bacteria
• Credibility of people on the
senior management team
• Management team’s experience
of similar products
• Cost
• Good Manufacturing Practice
(GMP) facilities for toxicology
and early phase clinical trials
Pre-clinical
Studies
• Toxicity studies
• Pharmacokinetics
• Pharmacodynamics
Yes • Observes Good Clinical
Practice (GCP)
• Location where animal trials
are more easily conducted
• Lower cost location
Regulatory
Clearance
• Prepare dossiers for  licensing
authority
No
Clinical Trials • Clinical  trials design and
location
• Compare therapeutic effects of
new and existing products
Yes • Clinical research organisations
located in the US and Poland
• N/A
                                                 
22 Their aim was to develop an extended release formulation of Medicine B, using Parter-1’s
technology to deliver therapeutic doses of the protein once a month in place of the current treatment’s
weekly injections.
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Registration
Launch and
Sales
• Reports for product approval
and user education
• Prepare marketing plan
• Sales
• Packaging
• Quality control
Yes • N/A
Table 4 –Key Development Tasks for Medicine B
Process development
The Chinese scientists had developed a laboratory process which, it was
thought, could be modified to make it amenable to scaling-up. COM, a
contract manufacturer based in a different part of the country, was selected to
manufacture the material for pre-clinical and clinical trials because it had
accreditation for Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP). COM had not
previously engaged in protein production but its scientists and senior
management had experience of manufacturing products similar to Medicine
B in other companies where they had previously worked.  It turned out that
re-engineering the process developed by the originator firm required a high
degree of skill and creativity from Company B’s contractors. For example,
Medicine B had to be correctly refolded into the three dimensional structure
exhibited naturally in the body. The protocol designed by the Chinese
scientists generated a high percentage of molecules that were folded
incorrectly. On redesigning the refolding procedure, COM scientists attained
a refolding efficiency of around 75%.23  It was necessary to convert the liquid
formulation to powder form, better suited to hot climates. To do this without
altering the structure of the target protein was a specialist art. Company B
                                                 
23 They also developed a purification process and found a German contract manufacturer to assist.
When the target protein had been purified, it was subjected to a series of analytical tests as stipulated by
the European Pharmacopoeia to determine its quality. COM was in a position to carry out the tests
except for the potency test. This required a license and specially designated handling areas and systems
to prevent viral contamination of products. Company B therefore engaged another contractor, Potest, to
develop and qualify this test for Company B.
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had to find a specialist contract manufacture to formulate the product and dry
it by lyophilisation.24
The cost and risk of phase I and phase II clinical trials of Medicine B were to
be jointly borne by Company B and Partner-1. Safety testing in animals was
difficult in the country where Company B was started and faced less hostility
and expense in Germany.25 Company B found a toxicology laboratory in
Germany, Toxtest, and assessed its suitability. A Malaysian company,
Mayman, was selected to perform vialling and packaging operations for the
global market.
Figure 6 shows how production processes related to the partnerships needed.
                                                 
24  Involves freezing the product under a vacuum at -42˚C.
25 The results from the pre-clinical studies are analysed by trained personnel and statisticians prior to
preparing dossiers for a licensing authority to request a license for clinical trials in a particular country.
The pre-clinical results together with a draft copy of the trial design in humans are presented to an
ethical committee for approval.
Medicine B-
Company B
Contract Producers:
COM(Country Alpha),
GMAN (Ger.), TOXTEST
(Ger.), POTEST (Country
Alpha), FORMAN
(Country Alpha),
MAMAN (M’sia)
Funders:
Two stock exchanges
in Europe and Asia
Competitors:
Pharma-B1 and
Pharma-B2
Complementary
Producers:
Partner-A (US)
Distributors Final
Customers
Regulators:
FDA and EMEA
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Figure 6: Company B’s Transaction Environment for Developing Medicine B
Figure 7 shows how various companies were enlisted into the network as the
development of Medicine B progressed.
Process Development:
Cell bank characterisation
Fermentation
Purification
Analysis
Formulation and vialling
Pre-clinical Testing:
Toxicity 
Pharmacodynamics
Pharmacokinetics
Novel Drug Delivery System
Manufacturing JV
Science Base 
Competitors
Regulators
In-licensing Pre-clinical
COM
GMAN
TOXTEST
FORMAN
POTEST
Partner-1
Chinese Research 
Institute
Pharma-B1 Pharma-B2
EMEA EGA
Company B: Medicine B
Figure 7: Drug Development Process for Medicine B
Partnerships can fall apart through factors outside a company’s control; this
happened when one of Company B’s European partners in a joint venture to
manufacture Medicine B suddenly withdrew without warning, temporarily
depriving Company B of access to essential (P2). This crisis was overcome
but might not have been.
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Funding has been a critical issue for Company B as for most
biopharmaceutical ventures. After the initial ordinary shares placing in 2000,
the company succeeded in issuing new shares on five occasions between
2003 and 2005, a period of investment downturn. There were times of acute
funding shortage when endorsement from partners was needed to provide the
venture with credibility in the eyes of investors and thus access to the
financial resources they needed for survival.
Company B’s Experience Analysed
Penrosian responses to uneven resource availability among firms in the
network are observed in this case study. Critical capability building occurred
at the network level because of the nature of the business environment and
selection forces faced by the new venture.
A reason for the relatively favourable funding position of Company B was
that their post-patent strategy was believed by investors to involve less
uncertainty than producing a new biopharm product. However, viability
depended on B achieving cost effective development and quality-endorsed
drug production. Replicating a drug to the level of quality attained by the
originator required ingenuity and innovative capability among the
participants in the international production network.
Effecting ‘new combinations’
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Competitive advantage generated through Schumpeterian ‘new
combinations’ is exemplified in this case. Most generic pharmaceutical
producers aim at price competition.  Company B also aimed at improvements
on existing products that would switch demand in their favour. The
company’s potential competitive advantage is a result of bringing together in-
licensed recombinant DNA technology with Partner-1’s proprietary drug
delivery technology. Collaboration with Partner-1, including shared
development costs and risks of phase I and phase II clinical trials, was in
their mutual interests since each company’s technology was insufficient to
replace existing products.
Improving the capabilities of network partners
Company B scanned the market for suitable contractors and gave them the
opportunity and stimulus to grow new capabilities. In the event, this proved
valuable to both parties. As Penrose argued, resource shortages and under-
used resources encourage the entrepreneurial firm to develop complementary
resources and find new domains of application (P6). Company B achieved
this by enlisting partners. Their contractor, COM, had not previously
produced protein but unused resource in the form of employee knowledge
built up in prior employment. This was initially largely tacit, but was shared
with other employees and rendered explicit through procedures (routine
building). Subsequently COM was able to build on experience gained by
working with Company B to improve its share of the expanding protein
contract manufacturing market. COM’s improved prospects were recognised
by investors, leading to an issue of new ordinary shares being oversubscribed
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seven times in a stock market placement in 2003. This illustrates how the
seizing of new market opportunities can take place not only within an
entrepreneurial firm but also among innovative firms which form an
innovative network (P7).
Creating favourable regulatory conditions
Both our cases exploited changes in external circumstances, but they were
proactive in shaping selection forces in their favour.  Selection forces in their
business environment (P1) include regulatory requirements. The advent of
new bio-generic products poses new regulatory challenges. Regulations for
determining their comparability with existing products and manufacturing
processes are not well established. Company B adopted a proactive stance on
this matter, working with regulatory bodies in Europe both independently and
through the European Generics Association (EGA). The CEO of Company B
was elected to the Board of EGA and the company’s Regulatory Affairs
Director chairs the Biotechnology Working Group of the EGA. This group is
actively lobbying the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) to
establish the regulatory pathway and data requirements necessary to register
Company B's products in Europe. Regulations and policies were an integral
part of the continually evolving selection environment faced by Company B,
but these were not beyond their influence. (P1).
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Likewise Company B demonstrates ways in which a new firm can be
proactive in shaping its own transaction environment (P3). Company B
sought finance in geographically dispersed capital markets as investors
became less interested in the funding of new biopharmaceutical ventures in
the wake of the millennial boom and slump. A critical element of influence
for the new venture is its choice of product focus. B’s decision to go for a
generic product ensured that it was operating in a regulatory environment that
was less demanding than that faced by completely new medical entities.
Moreover this was influenced by participation by Company B in bio-generics
standards setting.
From evidence to theory and practice
“The continual change in the productive services and knowledge within a
firm along with the continual change in external circumstances present the
firm with a continually changing productive opportunity.” (Penrose 1995 p.
150). We called this the resource-opportunity dynamic and saw how this
applies not only at the firm but at the network level. In conclusion we enlarge
the detailed focus of the case studies to view the way micro-processes shaped
broader developments.
(1) Entrepreneurial learning of the kind explored here responds and
contributes to non-linearities in a complex dynamic environment (Marion
1999; Garnsey and McGlade 2006). From these follow implications for the
understanding of innovation theory and practice.  The  focus on case evidence
showed that:
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(2) Learning in new entry firms is a path dependent process underlying the
growth of dynamic capabilities.
(3) Entrepreneurial learning is an iterative process shaped by the resource-
opportunity dynamic.
(4) The outcome of entrepreneurial learning is a distinctive innovation
process that alters the opportunity space of a complex environment.
(5) Entrepreneurial innovation sets off changes in the conditions that impact
upon it, whether or not individual entrepreneurial units achieve their
objectives.
(6) Selection forces in the economy are not impersonal and deterministic
forces impervious to agency. There is considerable scope for decisions by
specific individuals and teams to make a difference to outcomes and
conditions.
(1) Entrepreneurial learning as a path dependent process
That network learning is a path dependent process (P8) is consonant with
work since Penrose on dynamic capabilities. While Teece et al. (1997) see
dynamic capability as unique to a firm and difficult to imitate, Eisenhardt and
Martin (2000) have argued that dynamic capabilities can be replicated
elsewhere as organizational innovations. Our evidence on the way in which
firms in the biopharmaceutical network learn from each other shows that
these apparently conflicting accounts actually apply to different kinds of
capabilities. Those that are unique to the firm are embedded in its history and
its tacit knowledge base. Thus developing specialized capabilities for
innovative production required the sharing of tacit knowledge and new joint
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work between teams from different firms. Other capabilities depend on
procedures that can be copied from those who have demonstrated their
efficacy, as in the case of routines for conforming to regulatory procedures.
Either way, entrepreneurial learning promotes the application of prior
knowledge to new circumstances. This has important implications for
investors. If a project encounters setbacks, instead of writing off an investee
team that fails to meet pre-set targets and milestones, investors could look
more favourably on ways to capitalize on the firm’s knowledge base in
diverse rather than pre-determined ways, e.g. through the targeting of
alternative patient categories for a biopharm product.  This calls for
thoughtful application of real options approaches rather than a target-
dominated stage-gate approach (Goffin and Mitchell 2005).
(2) Entrepreneurial learning is an iterative process to which the resource-
opportunity dynamic contributes
 Entrepreneurial opportunity recognition and pursuit of opportunities occur as
an iterative process shaped by the actual and prospective resourcing
requirements of the entrepreneurial endeavour. Penrose’s conception of
enterprise as a dynamic matching process is in contrast with recent emphasis
on the pursuit of opportunity as the driving force in entrepreneurship (Shane
2000). The latter does not accord central place to the interactive processes
through which resourcing a venture and the pursuit of opportunity are in
dynamic interplay. The interweaving of venture-resourcing and
entrepreneurial pursuit of opportunity challenges the rationale for an
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intellectual division of labour between the fields of entrepreneurship studies
and new firm formation (Shane and Venkataram 2000). Entrepreneurial
innovation both enables new firm development and plays a distinctive and
critical role in the wider web of innovation.
(3) The outcome of entrepreneurial learning is an innovation process that
alters the opportunity space in a complex environment
The cases show that firms need not be passive opportunity detectors in a
given environment to which they have to adapt. The two innovative
biopharmaceutical start-ups in the case studies had entrepreneurs who aimed
not merely to adapt to an existing industrial environment but to construct a
habitat favourable to their business models. The entrepreneurial firm sets out
to create its own opportunities.26 The emergent network represents both
eventual resource-provider and a current source of opportunity for its
member firms, but the opportunity must be actualized through resource
sharing and building to create more favourable conditions for network
interaction.27 It is through the non-linearities of mutual feedback that the
network comes to provide a business environment for its creators. There are
implications for foresight exercises and corporate road-mapping practice
(Goffin and Mitchell 2005). The business environment is not independent of
the strategic journey but is continuously altered by strategies pursued.
(4) Entrepreneurial learning is a distributed process
                                                 
26 This supports the Schumpeterian view (1928) over that of Kirzner (Shane 2003).
27 A social structure such as a network operates both as the medium (in which activity takes place) and
as the collective outcome of such activity (Giddens 1984).
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Our cases reveal new entrants contributing to the co-evolution of
biopharmaceutical capability whether or not their particular projects succeed.
Entrepreneurial learning and innovation operate as distributed processes to an
extent obscured by investors’ focus on individual firms’ performance and
share price.  It remains to be seen how effective these companies will be in
sustaining their role as system integrators in their own network and in
propagating their innovations.  Innovative activity is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition of success for any one firm. However as a distributed
process, entrepreneurial innovation collectively advances emerging
technologies. There is a message for investors and policy makers here.
Investors could consider supporting a network of firms on whose
complementary activities the progress of a related set of promising
technologies depend, rather than backing individual ventures.
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